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Abstract—1 We consider the problem of secure unicast trans-
mission between two nodes in a directed graph, where an
adversary eavesdrops/jams a subset of nodes. This adversarial
setting is in contrast to traditional ones where the adversary
controls a subset of links. In particular, we study, in the main,
the class of routing-only schemes (as opposed to those allowing
coding inside the network). Routing-only schemes usually have
low implementation complexity, yet a characterization of the rates
achievable by such schemes was open prior to this work. We first
propose an LP based solution for secure communication against
eavesdropping, and show that it is information-theoretically rate-
optimal among all routing-only schemes. The idea behind our
design is to balance information flow in the network so that no
subset of nodes observe “too much” information. Interestingly,
we show that the rates achieved by our routing-only scheme
are always at least as good as, and sometimes better, than
those achieved by “naïve” network coding schemes (i.e. the rate-
optimal scheme designed for the traditional scenario where the
adversary controls links in a network rather than nodes.) We
also demonstrate non-trivial network coding schemes that achieve
rates at least as high as (and again sometimes better than) those
achieved by our routing schemes, but leave open the question
of characterizing the optimal rate-region of the problem under
all possible coding schemes. We then extend these routing-only
schemes to the adversarial node-jamming scenarios and show
similar results. During the journey of our investigation, we also
develop a new technique that has the potential to derive non-
trivial bounds for general secure-communication schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The secure network coding problem, introduced by Cai and
Yeung [1], considers communication of a secret message in
the presence of a computationally-unlimited adversary that
eavesdrops on a limited but unknown portion of the network.
Most existing work in the literature concerns the multicast
uniform link-based adversary case, where all links have equal
capacity and the adversary can eavesdrop on a limited number
of links. In this case, the maximum secure rate achievable
when only the source generates randomness has a simple
cut-set characterization [1], and is achieved by a number of
existing coding schemes, e.g. [2–4].
In this paper we consider the node-based adversary case,
where a computationally-unlimited adversary can eavesdrop
on a limited number of nodes. Much less is known about this
problem. Motivated by complexity considerations, we focus on
the class of routing-only schemes for unicast, in which only
1The authors are listed in alphabetical order.
the source performs coding while non-source nodes perform
routing. We formulate a linear program (LP) that balances
the amount of information flowing through any subset of
nodes, and show that its solution, which involves only simple
forwarding, achieves the optimal capacity within the class of
routing-only schemes. This class includes schemes involving
replication (transmitting multiple copies of a received packet);
our result shows that such replication does not improve rate.
We further show that our LP-based routing-only schemes
achieve rates that are always at least and sometimes higher
than rates achieved by naïve application of secure network
coding schemes designed for the uniform link-adversary case.
Related work by Cui et al. [5] considers the link-based
secrecy problem with unequal link capacities and/or restricted
eavesdropping sets, and give some achievable coding schemes
where random keys may be injected or canceled at interme-
diate nodes. We apply these approaches to the node-based
eavesdropping problem and show that they can sometimes
achieve higher rates than our routing-only schemes, though
at the expense of higher complexity.
We further extend our routing-only schemes to the problem
of coding against a node-based jamming adversary that can
introduce arbitrary errors at nodes under his control. The
problem of network error correction coding against a jam-
ming adversary was introduced by Yeung and Cai [6, 7].
Like the eavesdropping problem, network error correction
for the multicast uniform link-based adversary case has been
extensively studied, with various existing capacity-achieving
code constructions e.g. [7–9], while much less is known about
the node-based adversary case. Similarly, we show that our
routing-only schemes, obtained using the same LP formula-
tion, achieve rates that are never lower and sometimes higher
compared to that achieved by naïve application of network
error correction codes designed for the uniform link-adversary
case. However, unlike the eavesdropping case, we show that
replication can improve rate in the jamming case. Kosut et
al. [10] also consider node-based jamming adversaries, and
introduce non-linear network codes called “polytope codes" in
which intermediate nodes carry out comparison and signaling
operations. These codes can sometimes achieve higher rates
than routing-only schemes, but are more complex.
One “natural” restriction we consider in the jamming sce-
nario, in contrast to most work in the network error-correction
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2literature, is that the adversary is “causal”. That is, his jam-
ming actions cannot be based on future transmissions on the
network. Under this reasonable assumption, we note that the
power of the adversary is significantly weakened compared to
the “non-causal” scenario. Specifically, we show that ideas
in [11] lead to code designs in which the same rates can
be achieved against a causal omniscient adversary (one who
can see all causal transmissions in the network, and base his
jamming strategy as a function of these observations), as are
achieved by our schemes against a localized adversary (one
who can see only see transmissions on edges incoming to
him, and base his jamming strategy as a function of these
observations).
A. Notational Conventions
Calligraphic symbols such as N will denote sets. Boldface
symbols such as x will denote vectors, boldface upper-case
symbols such as X will denote random variables, non-boldface
lower-case symbols such as x will denote particular instantia-
tions of those random variables and non-boldface upper-case
symbols such as X will denote matrices.
II. MODEL
A. Network Model
Let a graph G = (V, E), where V is the vertex set, and
E is the edge set. There are two pre-specified nodes in V
– specifically s denotes the source node, and t denotes the
terminal node. For notational convenience, we denote by V
the set of internal nodes V \ {s, t}, i.e., the subset of nodes
of V excluding the source and terminal nodes. As is common
in the network coding literature [12], we assume each edge
has unit capacity.2 For any nodes v ∈ V , let Ein(v) denote the
set of incoming edges of node v and Eout(v) denote the set of
outgoing edges of node v. We also define Ein(A) and Eout(A)
be the set of incoming and outgoing edges of the nodes v ∈ A
respectively. For directed edge e = (v, v′) ∈ E , let head(e)
denote the head node of the edge e, i.e., head(e) = v′, and
tail(e) denote the tail node of the edge e, i.e., tail(e) = v. The
min-cut of the network between the source s and the terminal
t is denoted by C.
B. Source Encoding
A packet is defined as a length-n vector in the field Fq . Here
the field-size q, the number of packets in a generation N , the
rate R, the redundancy δ, and the key rate r are code-design
parameters to be specified later. We also define τ to be the
generation length, which satisfies N ≤ τC, i.e., the number
of packets in a generation is at most the generation length
times the min-cut. A visual presentation of these parameters
are given in Figure 1. The source s has a message M
drawn arbitrarily from the set {1, 2, . . . , qRNn(1−δ)}, and a
random variable key K distributed uniformly from the set
{1, 2, . . . , qrNn(1−δ)}. The source s then encodes the message
2In the node-adversary case this unit-capacity assumption is without loss
of generality (not so in the case when the adversary controls edges – see, for
instance, [5]).
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X(e1, 1) = X(e11, 1)
X(e3, 1) = X(e8, 1) = X(e12, 1)
X(e4, 1) = X(e9, 1) = X(e13, 1)
X(e6, 1) = X(e14, 1)
X(e1, 2) = X(e11, 2)
X(e3, 2) = X(e8, 2) = X(e12, 2)
X(e4, 2) = X(e9, 2) = X(e13, 2)
X(e6, 2) = X(e14, 2)
X(e1, 3) = X(e11, 3)
X(e2, 3) = X(e7, 3) = X(e12, 3)
X(e5, 3) = X(e10, 3) = X(e13, 3)
X(e6, 3) = X(e14, 3)
N
Generation
Length
τ = 3
C = 4
Fig. 1. Illustrating example for our code parameters: The source s wishes
to transmit a messge M to the terminal t over a network G = (E,V) with
min-cut C (in this example C = 4), specifically the so-called “cockroach
network” example first described in [10], and replicated on the upper right
of this figure. To this end, it first organizes M into τR = 8 packets (in
this example, the generation length τ = 3, and the rate R = 8/3), each
containing n(1− δ) symbols over Fq . It then generates a uniformly random
key K which it organizes into τr packets (in this example r = 4/3), each
containing n(1−δ) symbols over Fq . Next, the source uses Enc to encodeM
and K into N packets (in this example N = 12), each containing n symbols
over Fq . In each coding instant i within the generation of length τ the source
then injects at most C of these packets into the network (in this example
i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the outputs of the encoder are denoted X(e, i), for appropriate
e and i, and routed over the network according to the red paths denoted in
the three figures on the right). Finally, the terminal uses Dec to decodeM as
Mˆ. The set of all node encoders, along with the decoder, together comprise
the code C.
M and the key K by the source encoder Enc(s), and gener-
ates Nn symbols over Fq , i.e., Enc : {1, 2, . . . , qRNn(1−δ)}×
{1, 2, . . . , qrNn(1−δ)} → {1, 2, . . . , q(R+r)Nn}.
C. Linear Network Encoding
3There are three types of nodes in the network – “uncor-
rupted nodes”, “eavesdropping nodes”, and “jamming nodes".
Nodes in the first category are entirely honest, perform the
encoding operations specified in this section, and do not aim to
eavesdrop on communications. Nodes in the second category
also perform the encoding operations specified in this section,
but in addition attempt to eavesdrop on communication as
specified in Section II-D 1a. Nodes in the third category do
not perform the encoding operations specified in this Section
(their “jamming” is described in Section II-D 1b and 2a), and
in addition also attempt to eavesdrop on communications. We
shall call nodes in either of the first two categories “non-
jamming”.
3In some models, non-linear coding outperforms linear coding [10]. For
complexity reasons, we restrict our attention to linear codes.
3The random variable X(e, i) denotes the packet on edge e ∈
E at time i ∈ {1, . . . , τ}. For simplicity, we sometimes omit
the time index, and use X(e) to denote the set of all packets
going over an edge in a generation. We also denote X(E ′, i)
to be set of packets {e ∈ E ′ : X(e, i)} at time i ∈ {1, . . . , τ},
where E ′ ⊆ E .
Each non-jamming node in the network also has an encoder.
As mentioned before, in this work we restrict the internal
nodes in the network to “simple" operations, specifically
causal linear operations4 over Fq . That is, the packets trans-
mitted on each outgoing edge of a node v are linear functions
of the packets arriving on incoming edges of v.
We distinguish two types of network encoding schemes:
Routing schemes: In a routing scheme, the set of packets
leaving a node v are subsets of packets incoming to that node.
That is, any packet X(e, i) transmitted on an edge e ∈ Eout(v)
at time i ∈ {1, . . . , τ} equals a packet X(e′, j) transmitted on
an edge e′ ∈ Ein(v) at time j ≤ i. Note that this includes
“replication”, i.e., a node is allowed to transmit multiple copies
of a packet it has observed.
Coding schemes: In a coding scheme, the set of packets
leaving a node v are linear combinations of packets incoming
to that node5. These linear combinations can be of two types.
In scalar linear network coding schemes, each outgoing packet
corresponds to a causal linear combination (over Fq) of the
packets that v has already observed. That is, for any packet
X(e, i) with tail(e) ∈ V , we have
X(e, i) =
∑
j≤i
∑
e′:head(e′)=tail(e)
β(e′, e, j)X(e′, j), (1)
where the linear network coding coefficients β(e, e′, j) are
scalars from Fq .
In vector linear network coding schemes, each symbol of
each outgoing packet corresponds to a linear combination
(over Fq) of all the symbols of all the packets that v has already
observed. That is, for any packet X(e, i) with tail(e) ∈ V , we
have
X(e, i) =
∑
j≤i
∑
e′:head(e′)=tail(e)
B(e′, e, j)X(e′, i) (2)
where B(e′, e, j) are matrices in Fnq × Fnq . In particular, if
B(e′, e, j) = β(e′, e, j)I , it is a scalar linear network coding
scheme.6
4In most of the network coding literature, we do not explicitly worry
about causality, since a “limited” amount of non-causality can be simulated
by pipelining (buffering at each node). However, in adversarial jamming
problems the throughout against a causal adversary can be higher than
against a noncausal adversary. In this work, this is indeed the case
in the Omniscient Jammer model. Hence we explicitly focus on causal
adversaries.
5In this model we disallow the possibility that an internal node in the
network generates private randomness, and uses this to generate outgoing
packets. It can be shown (see [5], and Figure 6 in Section VI) that in fact
such a strategy can sometimes increase the throughput of networks.
6Vector linear network coding schemes are more general than scalar linear
network coding schemes – see [13]. In general, all the achievability schemes
we present in this paper are based on scalar linear network coding schemes.
However, some of the non-achievability results we present work even for
vector linear network coding schemes.
For both these types of codes, the choice of coding coeffi-
cients is part of the code design, and is explicitly specified
later in the various schemes we construct. In general they
may be chosen either deterministically (as a function of G) or
randomly7. We define the network code C to be a triple that
contains source encoder Enc(s), intermediate node encoders
Enc(v) for all v ∈ V and terminal decoder Dec(t). That is,
C = (Enc(s), Enc(V), Dec(t)) – here Enc(V) is Enc(v)
where v ∈ V .
D. Adversarial Models and Corresponding Communication
Goals
We focus on two broad classes of adversarial models –
localized and omniscient adversaries, and their correspond-
ing communication goals. Localized adversaries are usually
considered as the adversaries in the wired model, omniscient
adversaries are usually considered as the adversaries in the
wireless model.
1) Localized Adversaries: An adversary is said be to localized
if it only has a casual “localized” view of network traffic,
depending on the nodes in Z it controls. That is, a localized
adversary that observes Z can observe the packets incoming
to the set of nodes Z . Its “attack strategy" can be a causal
function of these observations (and also its knowledge of G
and C, and the terminal’s decoding function, as defined below).
We consider three types of communication problems against
localized adversaries:
a) Eavesdropping: The set of nodes eavesdropped by the
adversary ZE is a set of at most zE nodes in V , chosen by the
adversary as a function of his knowledge of G and C, prior to
communication starting. That is, ZE ⊆ V : G × C → PzE (V),
where PzE (V) denotes the set of all subsets of V of size
less than or equal to zE . Given this choice, at time i the
adversary observes packets X(Ein(ZE), j) with j ≤ i, the
information on edges incoming to nodes in ZE at time j ≤ i.
Given these packets, the adversary’s estimate Mˆ of M is
allowed to be an arbitrary (possibly probabilistic) function of
the packets he observes, the network G, and the network code
C. Adversarial Communication Goals Against a Localized
Eavesdropper: Prior to the communication commencing, both
M and K are known only to the source s itself, and not to any
other party. s wishes to transmit the message M to t over the
network G, such that the secrecy and decodability requirements
described in (4) and (3) in II-E below are satisfied.
b) Jamming: The set of nodes jammed by the adversary ZJ
is a set of at most zJ nodes in V . Given this choice, at time
i the adversary can access X(Ein(ZJ), j) with j ≤ i. Given
the network G and the network code C, he then corrupts the
information of the outgoing links of ZJ , that he replaces
X(Eout(ZJ), i) by X̂(Eout(ZJ), i) for all i ∈ {1, ..., τ}. The
adversary’s transmissions X̂(e, i) on edges e outgoing from
nodes in ZJ are allowed to be arbitrary (possibly probabilistic)
casual functions of the packets he observes, the network G,
and the network code C.
7Each node chooses its linear network coding coefficients uniformly at
random over Fq , for instance [14].
4Adversarial Communication Goals Against a Localized Jam-
mer: In this scenario, s wishes to transmit the message M to
t over the network G, such that the decodability requirement
described in (3) is satisfied.
c) Eavesdropping and Jamming: The set of nodes eaves-
dropped and jammed by the adversary Z is a set of at
most z nodes in V . Given the network G and the network
code C, he corrupts the information of the outgoing links
of Z which is the same as the Localized Jamming case.
Furthermore, the source s also wishes the message is secure
to the adversarial nodes Z which has the same setting as the
Localized Eavesdropping case.
Adversarial Communication Goals Against a Localized Eaves-
dropper/Jammer: s wishes to transmit the message M to t
over the network G, such that the secrecy and decodability
requirements described in (3) and (4) in II-E are satisfied.
2) Causal Omniscient Adversaries: An adversary is said to
be causal omniscient if it has a “global but causal" view of
the network traffic. That is, a causal omniscient adversary
that observes all the information X(e, i) transmitted over every
edge e and all time i, though its jamming can only be a causal
function in i.8 Its “attack strategy" can be a causal function
of these observations (and also its knowledge of G and C).
a) Jamming: Given the information transmitting over the
network G, at time i the adversary can access X(e, j) with
e ∈ E and j ≤ i. The set of nodes jammed by the adversary Z
is a set of at most zJ nodes in V . Given this and the network
G, the network code C, he then corrupts the information of
the outgoing links of Z , that is, replace X(Eout(Z), i) by
X̂(Eout(Z), i).
Adversarial Communication Goals Against a Omniscient Jam-
mer: In this case, s wishes to transmit the message M to t
over the network G, such that the decodability requirement
described in (3) is satisfied.
E. Terminal Decoding
In each of the four adversarial models above, the communi-
cation goals always include the “decodability" condition. Only
the Localized Eavesdropping and Localized Eavesdropping
and Jamming models also include the “secrecy" condition.
The former is defined in 1, and the latter is defined in 2 below.
1) Decodability: We define the decoding function of termi-
nal t to be Dec, where Dec : {1, 2, . . . , q(R+r)Nn} →
{1, 2, . . . , qRNn(1−δ)}. Let M̂ = Dec(Enc(M)) be the
message that the terminal t decodes. The terminal t is
required to be able to decode the original message M
with arbitrarily high probability. That is, we need
Pr
A,C
(M̂ 6= M) < 1. (3)
for arbitrarily small 1.
2) Secrecy: The source s transmits the message M with
∆-securely to the terminal t. That is, we require the
8In fact, a secrecy constraint does not make sense in the case of omniscient
adversaries, since adversaries by definition know all transmissions in the entire
network.
mutual information between the source’s message and
the adversary’s estimate of it to be “small”, that is,
I (M;X(Ein(ZE))) ≤ ∆.9 (4)
In particular, if ∆ = 0, we say the message M is
perfectly secure.
The overall probability of error10 Pre of a transmission
scheme can be separated into two parts. The probability of
decoding error and the probability of leakage. The probability
of decoding error, denoted by 1, is PrA,C(M̂ 6= M). The
probability of leakage error, denoted by 2, is defined as
PrA,C(I (M;X(Ein(Z))) > ∆).
F. Code Parameters
The rate R = 1nN logq |M| is achievable if for any  > 0,
there exists δ > 0 such that there is a coding scheme with
rate at least R − δ with the overall probability of error Pe =
PrA,C(M̂ 6= M) + PrA,C(I (M;X(Ein(Z))) > ∆) <  for
large enough nN and q.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. Routing Linear Program
We first introduce the linear program that gives us a baseline
routing scheme for each of the four models above.
Let P be the set of all paths from s to t. For path p ∈ P ,
a natural internal variable in the Linear Program 1 (defined
in Equations (5) – (7)) is the flow through path p, denoted by
F (p).
Linear Program 1
F (z) = max
∑
p∈P
F (p)− λ(z), (5)
subject to ∀e ∈ E ,
∑
p:p3e
F (p) ≤ 1, (6)
∀Z ⊂ V, |Z| ≤ z,
∑
p:|p∩Z|>0
F (p) ≤ λ(z).
(7)
In LP1, the maximum value of the objective function in (5)
is denoted by F (z). Equation (6) says that the flows passing
through a link are bounded by its capacity (which equals 1).
Equation (7) bounds the flow through any set of nodes with
|Z| ≤ z. This flow is bounded from above by λ(z) – the LP
attempts to ensure that not too much flow passes through any
set of z nodes, while simultaneously maximizing the overall
flow. Here, λ(z) is also a variable of LP1. The choice of rate
R and key-rate r for each of our routing scheme depends
critically on λ(z).
9Intuitively, this inequality means that the communication scheme leaks at
most ∆ units of information.
10These definitions are for maximal probability of error (over all messages
M) and hence also work averaged over M. The converses we prove also
work averaged over M, and hence are also true for the worst-case M.
5Lemma 1. If the optimal solution for LP1 with
∑
p∈P F (p) <
C. Then, there is another optimal solution satisfies∑
p∈P F (p) = C.
Proof: Suppose the optimal solution of LP1 is ((∀p ∈
P, F0(p)), λ0) such that the sum of all flows
∑
p∈P F0(p) <
C and let F0 =
∑
p∈P F0(p). So, the optimal objective
function is F0 − λ0. Note that in this network, we can still
inject Fin = C − F0 fraction of flows into the network since
the sum of all flows F0 < C. Then, we have the sum of all
flows
∑
p∈P F
′(p) = C. Denote the increment of λ0 after the
injection of Fin to be λin, we have λin ≤ Fin. Also, we have
∀Z ⊂ V, ∑p:p3vi,i∈Z F ′(p) ≤ λ0 + λin, where λin ≤ Fin.
This means, the increment of the flows that passing through
Z is λin. So, the objective function after the flow injection is
C − (λ0 + λin) ≥ C − (λ0 + Fin) = F − λ0. Since F − λ0
is optimal, and so as C − (λ0 + λin).
By Lemma 1, LP1 can be reduced into the following linear
program. Linear Program 1’
max C − λ(z)
subject to ∀e ∈ E ,
∑
p:p3e
F (p) ≤ 1
∀Z ⊂ V,
∑
p:|p∩Z|>0
F (p) ≤ λ(z)
∑
p∈P
F (p) = C
Note that the size of P is exponential to the network size, that
means, there are exponential number of variables. In order to
reduce the complexity of solving the linear program, we then
consider the following linear program which is equivalent to
LP1’. So, we use the standard form of linear program as max-
flow min-cut theorem. That is, instead of using the flow on
the paths F (p) where p ∈ P as the variables, we use the flow
on the edges F (e) where e ∈ E to be the variables in the
following linear program.
Linear Program 2
max C − λ(z)
subject to ∀v ∈ V,
∑
e:e∈Ein(v)
F (e) =
∑
e:e∈Eout(v)
F (e)
∀Z ⊂ V,
∑
e:e∈Ein(v),v∈Z
F (e) ≤ λ(z)
∑
e:e∈Eout(s)
F (e) =
∑
e:e∈Ein(t)
F (e) = C
IV. MAIN RESULTS
We show that the adversarial nodes problem can be solved
by routing scheme. The routing is provided by LP1’. We
use the same encoding process as [11] in the localized jam-
ming/localized eavesdropping and jamming/omniscient jam-
ming cases. For the localized eavesdropping, we use Vander-
monde matrix as the encoding matrix.
Theorem 1. R = C − λ(z), where λ(z) is obtained by
an optimal solution from LP1’, is achievable for localized
eavesdropping.
We show that the achievable scheme for localized eaves-
dropping is optimal.
Theorem 2. The achievable scheme for localized eavesdrop-
ping is optimal among routing schemes.
Furthermore, we discovered the graphical properties of the
network. The converse for localized eavesdropping against
1 eavesdropped node can be shown by careful combine the
information-theoretic inequalities from its graphical properties.
Theorem 3. R = C − λ(z), where λ(z) is the variable of
LP1’, is achievable for localized jamming.
Theorem 4. R = C − 2λ(z), where λ(z) is the variable of
LP1’, is achievable for localized eavesdropping and jamming.
Theorem 5. R = C − λ(z), where λ(z) is the variable of
LP1’, is achievable for omniscient jamming.
V. PROOFS
A. Localized Eavesdropping
Proof of Theorem 1: By LP1’, each path p is assigned a flow
F (p). It is clear that F (p) is rational for any p ∈ P since all
the coefficients in LP1’ are rational. Let τ be the minimum
positive integer such that τF (p) ∈ Z+. One may consider the
scaling factor is scaling the capacity of each link up to τ . Or,
one could also consider τ as the time in a generation. That is,
there are C packets transmitted at time i for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , τ}
and there are N = τC packets transmitted to terminal t in
each section. Now, let us consider the following scheme with
rate R = C − λ.
Source: Let m = (m1, . . . ,mτR) be the message transmit-
ted, and k = (k1, . . . , kτλ) be the keys. The keys are uniformly
random over Fq which is not known to the eavesdropper. So,
the messages and the keys are “embedded" and transmitted
over the network and the eavesdropper thus is confused by
the random keys. Let V a Vandermonde matrix with size
N×N , be the source encoder matrix. Let x = (m k)T and the
information to be transmitted from s is Vx. So, each packet
corresponds to an entry of Vx.
Intermediate Nodes: The packets are transmitted via the
routes given by LP1’.
Terminal: At terminal t, the terminal t simply multiplies
V−1 with the received information Vx. Hence, x is recovered.
For any Z ⊂ V , the total amount of flows passing through Z
is at most τλ. There are also τλ uniform random numbers that
are not known by the eavesdropper. Thus, the eavesdropper is
not able to get any information of the original message no
matter which set of Z nodes he observes. Therefore, the rate
R = C − λ is achievable by the above scheme.
Proof of Theorem 2:
Step 1: We first show that there is a routing scheme without
replicating that performs at least as well as any routing scheme
6A. Eavesdropper B. Localized jammer C. Localized eavesdropper/jammer D. Omniscient jammer
1.1 Naïve coding C − Γin(Z) [1] C − Γout(Z) [11] C − Γin(Z)− Γout(Z) [15] C − Γout(Z) [11]
if Γout(Z) < C/2 if Γin(Z) + Γout(Z) < C if Γout(Z) < C/2
1.2 Toy example 2 0 0 0
2.1 Routing = C − λ(z) ≥ C − λ(z) ≥ C − 2λ(z) ≥ C − λ(z)
if λ(z) < C/2 if λ(z) < C/2 if λ(z) < C/2
2.2 Toy example 8/3 8/3 4/3 8/3
3.1 Coding ≥ C − λ(z) [5] ≥ C − λ(z) ≥ C − 2λ(z) ≥ C − λ(z)
3.2 Toy example 3 3 open 3
Fig. 2. Here, λ(z) is the optimal value of the variable λ in LP1’. Eavesdropping: In the cockroach network that first describe in [10], 1 eavesdropped node
can be regarded as 2 eavesdropping links (since each node has 2 incoming links). So, the best achievable rate for this example is 2 by [1]. In our routing
scheme, the rate R = 8/3 is achievable for the cockroach network example – see Figure 1. We Further show that the rate R = 3 is achievable in the
cockroach network example if smart coding is allowed – see Figure 4. A more general achievable scheme is shown in [5]. Localized Jamming: The rate for
the cockroach network is 0 if we use the scheme in [11] directly. The rate R = 8/3 is achievable for the cockroach network – see the proof of Theorem 3
for the encoding process. The rate R = 3 is achievable in the example if non-linear coding is allowed – see Figure 5. (Here the casual omniscient jamming
has the same results as the localized jamming – see [11]). Localized Eavesdropping and Jamming: The rate for the cockroach network is 0 if we use the
scheme in [15] directly. The rate R = 4/3 is achievable if routing in for the cockroach network – see Remark 2 for the encoding process. The coding rate
is not known for this case.
with replicating.11 Suppose there is a node v ∈ V that performs
replicating. Consider the routing scheme obtained by removing
all but one of the replicated packets from the network (keeping
only one of those reaching the terminal, if there is one such,
else removing all of the packets). Under this new routing
scheme, the information received by the terminal still enables
it to reconstruct as well as under the previous scheme. In
addition, removing packets from the network can only improve
the secrecy requirement. Sequentially removing all replicated
packets thus results in a routing-without-replicating scheme
with performance at least as good as the original scheme.
Next, we give a more nuanced argument to show that in
fact, for an optimal routing scheme, even the packets leaving
the source must be essentially (statistically) independent. Let
p1, p2, . . . , pk be all the paths from the source s to the terminal
t. Let P(j) be the random variable transmitted on the path pj .
So, for the paths pj 3 e, we have H (P(j), j : pj 3 e) ≤ 1. We
assume the secrecy I (M;P(Z)) ≤ 2 and the probability of
decoding error Pre = PrA,C(M̂ 6= M) ≤ 1. By the Slepian-
Wolf Theorem [16], we can construct a new random variable
P̂(j) for each path pj from the source s to the terminal t
with certain properties. Firstly, the set {P̂(j)} still carries
essentially all the information that the set or original random
variables {P(j)} carried, and hence the terminal can still
decode M. Second, each P̂(j) is a function only of P(j), and
hence the new routing scheme divulges no more information
to the eavesdropper than the original scheme (due to the data-
processing inequality). Third, the individual entropies of each
new random variable is no more than the entropy of the
original random variable, hence the edge-capacity constraints
are not violated by the new routing scheme. Finally, the joint
entropy of the new random variables is essentially the same
as the sums of their individual entropies. Specifically, for any
′ > 0, there is a sufficiently large m (number of generations),
11We defined replicating routing schemes as those in which an internal
node transmits the same incoming packet at least twice on outgoing edges.
such that
∑k
j=1H
(
P̂(j)
)
= H (P(1)m, . . . ,P(k)m) +m′.
For each j, the specific choice of P̂(j) that satisfies these
constraints simultaneously corresponds to the output of the j-
th Slepian-Wolf source encoder operating at any rate-point on
the sum-rate constraint of Slepian-Wolf rate-region.
Step 2: We now use the properties of the new routing
scheme derived in Step 1 to argue that in fact the rate specified
by the solution of LP1 is also an outer bound on the achievable
rate for routing-only schemes.
mR = H (Mm) (8)
≤ H
(
Mm, P̂(Z)m
)
(9)
≤ H
(
Mm|P̂(Z)m
)
+ I
(
Mm; P̂(Z)m
)
(10)
≤ H
(
Mm|P̂(Z)m
)
−H
(
Mm|P̂(Z)m, P̂(Z)
m)
+H
(
Mm|P̂(Z)m, P̂(Z)
m)
+m1 (11)
≤ I
(
M; P̂(Z)
m
|P̂(Z)m
)
+1 + mR+m∆ (12)
≤ H
(
P̂(Z)
m)
+ 1 + mR+m∆ (13)
= mC −mH
(
P̂(Z)
)
−m′ + 1 + mR+m∆ (14)
where P̂(Z) denotes the random variables {P̂(1), . . . , P̂(k)}\
P̂(Z). Inequality (12) holds by Fano’s inequality, and the
last equality holds due to the “near-independence” of P̂(j),
as argued in Step 1 (the remaining steps follow from stan-
dard information identities and inequalities). Hence R ≤
1
1−
[
C −H
(
P̂(Z)
)
− ′ + 1m + ∆
]
. But this entropy in-
equality must hold for each set Z . But these, along with the
entropy inequalities constraining the rate on each edge to be
at most 1, match the corresponding achievable rate given by
LP1.
7B. Alternate outer bound for z = 1
We now present an alternative proof technique for the outer
bound on the rate in the scenario when the network has just
a single node-based eavesdropper. This technique provides
an interesting graphical characterization of optimal routing-
based schemes. Unfortunately this technique, as presented,
does not extend to the case when z > 1, nor when coding
is allowed inside the network. Nonetheless, we are hopeful
that one or both of these limitations may be overcome if
our techniques are combined with a more careful analysis of
structured information inequalities, such as those presented in
Madiman-Tetali [17].
Definition 1 (Node-cut). A set of nodes N ⊂ V is called a
node-cut if after removing the nodes in N there does not exist
any path from s to t in the network.
Of particular interest are minimal node-cuts.
Definition 2 (Minimal node-cut). A set of nodes N ⊂ V is
called a minimal node-cut if N is a node-cut and no proper
subset of N is a node-cut. The set of all minimal node-cuts is
denoted by N̂ .
We first show the existence of a minimal node-cut satisfying
certain properties. Specifically, we show that each node in this
node-cut must be either capacity constrained (the flow passing
through the node is constrained by the capacities of incoming
outgoing edges) or secrecy constrained (the flow passing
through the node is constrained by the requirement that there
be no information-leakage if that node is eavesdropped on).
Such a node-cut, combined with carefully chosen information
inequalities, is used to obtain an information theoretic upper
bound on the capacity of the network. The scheme in LP1
achieves this upper bound.
For a minimal node-cut N̂ we define the following sets.
E(N̂ ) ,
{
e = (u, v) ∈ E : u, v ∈ N̂
}
N̂λ ,
{
v ∈ N̂ :
∑
p:p3v
f(p) = λ
}
N̂C , {v ∈ N̂ : v 6∈ N̂λ,
∑
p:p3v
f(p) =
min
{
|{e ∈ Ein(v) \ E(N̂ )}|, |{e ∈ Eout(v) \ E(N̂ )}
}
}
Lemma 2. For a given single-source single sink network G,
there exists a minimal node-cut N̂ such that
N̂ = N̂λ ∪ N̂C . (15)
Proof: We prove the lemma by contradiction. Assume
there does not exists a minimal node-cut in the given network
with property (15). Consider the minimal node-cut N̂ = {v :
∃e = (s, v) ∈ E} and define the set U(N̂ ) = {u ∈ N̂ :
u 6∈ N̂λ ∪ N̂C}. Then there exists a node u ∈ N such that
u 6∈ N̂λ ∪ N̂C .
Now consider the set tail(Eout(U))∪N̂ \U and choose any
minimal node-cut N̂ ′ ⊆ tail(Eout(U))∪N̂ \U . By assumption,
there must exist some non-empty set U(N̂ ′) = {u ∈ N̂ ′ : u 6∈
N̂ ′λ ∪ N̂ ′C}. Repeat the process of finding new minimal node-
cut until we find a node w in a new node-cut N̂ ′′ such that
there exist edge (w, t) and w 6∈ N̂ ′′λ ∪ N̂ ′′C .
Note that the above process reveals existence of a path p :
s, v, . . . , w, t such that f(p) < 1, which implies
∑
p∈P f(p) <
C, which is a contradiction.
Alternative proof of the outer bound. By Lemma 2, let N̂ be
the node-cut we consider in the network G. Note that for any
node v ∈ N̂ , we have the following sequence of inequalities:
R = H (M) (16)
≤ H
(
M|X(Ein(N̂ ) \ E(N̂ ))
)
+I
(
M;X(Ein(N̂ ) \ E(N̂ )
)
(17)
= I
(
M;X(Ein(N̂ ) \ E(N̂ )
)
(18)
= I
(
M;X(Ein(N̂ \ {v}) \ E(N̂ )|X(Ein(v) \ E(N̂ ))
)
+I
(
M;X(Ein(v) \ E(N̂ ))
)
(19)
≤ H
(
X(Ein(N̂ \ {v}) \ E(N̂ )|X(Ein(v) \ E(N̂ ))
)
(20)
= H
(
X(Ein(N̂ ) \ E(N̂ ))
)
−H
(
X(Ein(v) \ E(N̂ ))
)
(21)
Here (18) follows from the requirement that the message M
be decodable from the network transmissions, (20) from the
requirement that there be no information leakage, and the
remaining are standard information identities and inequalities.
Summing up the above inequalities for every v ∈ N̂λ, we have
|N̂λ|R ≤ |N̂λ|H
(
X(Ein(N̂ ) \ E(N̂ ))
)
−
∑
v∈N̂λ
H
(
X(Ein(v) \ E(N̂ ))
)
(22)
Note that ∑
v∈N̂λ
H
(
X(Ein(v) \ E(N̂ ))
)
+
∑
v∈N̂C
H
(
X(Ein(v) \ E(N̂ ))
)
≥ H
(
X(Ein(N̂ ) \ E(N̂ ))
)
(23)
8So, we have
|N̂λ|R ≤ |N̂λ|H
(
X(Ein(N̂ ) \ E(N̂ ))
)
−
∑
v∈N̂λ
H
(
X(Ein(v) \ E(N̂ ))
)
(24)
≤
(
|N̂λ| − 1
)
H
(
X(Ein(N̂ ) \ E(N̂ ))
)
+
∑
v∈N̂C
H
(
X(Ein(v) \ E(N̂ ))
)
(25)
=
(
|N̂λ| − 1
)
C
+
∑
v∈N̂C
∣∣∣X(Ein(v) \ E(N̂ ))∣∣∣ (26)
Therefore,
R ≤
(
1− 1|N̂λ|
)
C+
1
|N̂λ|
∑
v∈N̂C
∣∣∣X(Ein(v) \ E(N̂ ))∣∣∣ (27)
Note that (23) is equivalent to |N̂λ|λ +∑
v∈N̂C
∣∣∣X(Ein(v) \ E(N̂ ))∣∣∣ ≥ C. Hence, R ≤ C − λ
can be verified by putting (23) into (27).
C. Localized Jamming
Proof of Theorem 3:
We use the same achievable scheme as [11] for the localized
jamming scenario. Roughly speaking, each packet contains 3
parts in this achievable scheme. That is, information about the
message, a seed of hash function, and the value of the hash.
Source: First, the source s fixes a number R′ =
b(1− N+1n ) (N − τλ)c. Let the source encoder matrix be a
Vandermonde matrix V with size (n−N − 1)N × nR′. Let
x be the vector of the original message. The vector x is of
dimension nR′. There are τ timeslots in one section, where
τ is the minimum positive integer such that τF (p) ∈ Z+. In
each section, the source s is transmitting N = τC packets
to the terminal t. More precisely, C packets are transmitted
to the terminal t at time i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , τ}. Let us denote
p1, p2, . . . , pN be the packets that the source s transmits to the
terminal t. We also denote the corresponding encoding matrix
for the packet pj to be V(pj). The size of the matrix V(pj)
equals (n − N − 1) × nR′. Also note that the concatenation
of V(pj) for all j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} is exactly the encoding
matrix V. Let ρ be a random number that uniformly chosen
in Fq . Define T(pj), U and D as follows,
T(pj) = V(pj)x (28)
U = [1, ρ, ρ2, . . . , ρn−N−1] (29)
D = U[T(p1) T(p2) . . . T(pN )] (30)
Where T(pj) is the vector that contains the information about
the message, U is the hash function with respect to ρ, and D
is the value of the hash. So, T(pj) is the column vector of
size n−N − 1, D is a row vector of size N . Let the whole
packet pj to be [T(pj) D ρ]. Clearly, the packet size is n, and
s t
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Fig. 3. An example that shows that higher rates may be achievable in
the Causal Omniscient Jamming model than are achievable Localized
Eavesdropping model. This is contrary to the behavior one sees in the link-
adversary case – see, for instance, [18], and is thus somewhat surprising.
The example requires nodes inside the network to perform replication – as
shown in the characterization of the capacity of the Localized Eavesdropping
model, in-network replication does not help improve the rate. Suppose one of
the nodes in the network is a causal omniscient jammer. Further suppose that
the source s uses the same encoding as Theorem 3. The nodes in the first layer
replicate the packets and send out identical copies on each outgoing link. So,
each node in the second layer receives the same set of packets, and each then
forwards their outgoing packets. If one of the nodes from the second layer
is jammed, terminal t can decode correctly without any rate loss by majority
decoding. So, the optimal adversarial strategy is to jam a node in the first
layer. Therefore, a rate R = 5 is achievable. However, solving LP1 shows us
that the optimal rate achievable in the Localized Eavesdropping model is 4.
the last symbol of the packets ρ is the seed of the hash.
Intermediate Nodes: The packets pj are transmitted from
the source s to the terminal t follows the corresponding paths.
That is, intermediate nodes v ∈ V preform routing (not
replicating) that is given by LP1’.
Terminal: At terminal t, the decoding procedure is the
following. Let the terminal receives [T̂(pj) D̂ ρ̂] for j ∈
{1, 2, . . . , N}. The terminal t first determines [D′ ρ′] by
choosing the majority of received packets in a section. Since
ρ′ is now fixed, we have U′ is also fixed. Then, the terminal t
checks whether U′T̂(pj) equals the j-th symbol of D′. Denote
this set of packets to be PD.
Next, the terminal t concatenates the matrices V(pj) for
pj ∈ PD into a matrix, denoted by VD. Note that(
T̂(p′1) T̂(p
′
2) · · · T̂(p′|PD|)
)T
= VDx (31)
where p′ corresponds to the packets in PD. So, x can be
founded by inverting the matrix VD. The probability of
decoding error equals 1 − nN2−m is shown in [11], where
m is the field size parameter.
Remark 1. If nodes in V are not allowed to replicate incoming
packets to outgoing links, the achievable rate is indeed optimal
– see [11]. If nodes in V are allowed to replicate incoming
packets to outgoing links, the achievable rate can be improved
– see Figure 3.
Remark 2. For the proof of Theorem 4, the only difference
between the proof of Theorem 3 is that x = (m k) where m is
the message with size nR′′ in which R′′ = b(1− N+1n ) (N −
2τλ)c and k is the key with size nb(1− N+1n ) τλc.
Remark 3. The proof of Theorem 5 is the same as the proof
of Theorem 3.
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m2 + k2
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k1 + k2
m3 + k2
m1 +m2 + k1 + k2
m2 + k2
k1
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k1 + k2
m2 + k1 + k2
m3 + k1 + k2
m3 + k2
2
Fig. 4. An example, for the cockroach network, of a “careful coding” scheme
that beats any routing scheme in the Localized Eavesdropping model. It can
be verified by solving Linear Program 1 that the routing-only rate equals
8/3. However, it can be verified that in the scenario that z = 1, i.e., at most
one node is eavesdropped on, the scheme outlined in this figure ensures that
a rate R of 3 is perfectly securely achievable.
s t
1
3
4
5
x2
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x1 + x2
x1 + x3
x2
x3
x3
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x2
x2
x2
x3
x3


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x1 + x3
Fig. 5. An example demonstrating that allowing coding operations inside the
network can in general leads to capacities that are greater than are possible
by the routing-only schemes we present in this work. Specifically, suppose
the cockroach network was augmented by a link with “small” capacity to
each of nodes 4 and 5. In this case, as in [11] the (honest) source can send
check-sums of the packets that should have reached each of nodes 4 and 5
via other routes in previous generations – if these do not match the packets
actually received by those nodes, they can discard these packets and forward
the “useful” packets, leading to an achievable rate of 3. In contrast, our routing
schemes can achieve a rate of at most 8/3 + .
D. Encoding Complexity versus Rate-optimal Loss
Note that the size of encoding matrix is determined by N =
τC. Since τ is the parameter determined by LP1’, the encoding
complexity is large when τ is also large. In this section, we
will give the rate loss when we fix τ .
Lemma 3. For τ ′ fixed, denote the corresponding rate to be
R′. We have R−R′ < |E|τ ′ .
Proof: Solving the bf Linear Program 2 of network G
gives us the flow value F (e) on each link e ∈ E . Reduce
the network G by setting each link to be capacity F (e) and
multiply τ ′ to each link of the network G. So, each link has
capacity equals to τ ′F (e), denote this scaled network to be
G′. Denote the network G′′ to be the quantization on each link
e to be integer value, i.e., taking bτ ′F (e)c. So, the capacity
on each link e is reduced by a value at most 1. Therefore,
the capacity of the network G′′ is reduced at most |E| from
the network G′. Therefore, the capacity of the network G by
fixing τ ′ reduced is at most |E|τ ′ . Hence, R−R′ < |E|τ ′ .
s t
k1 k2
m + k1 m + k1 + k2 m + k2
k1 k1 k2 k2
Fig. 6. An example demonstrating that in some scenarios, if nodes inside
the network are allowed to inject randomness, higher rates can be achieved
than if this is not allowed (this observation was previously made in [5] – we
repeat it here with a simpler example).
VI. BEYOND ROUTING
In this Section we demonstrate that carefully chosen net-
work codes can indeed outperform many of the routing-only
schemes presented as some of the main results of this work.
However, the complexity of designing and implementing these
schemes is in general much higher than that of the routing
schemes we focus on. Also, a complete characterization the
optimal throughout of such schemes is still open, and is thus,
in the main, left open in this work.
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